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PEOPLE V. COLE1 : IS THE INCARCERATION




Valance Cole was convicted of manslaughter in the first
degree and related charges and was sentenced to twelve and one-
half years to twenty-five years in prison with concurrent lesser
terms of imprisonment on the related charges. 3 The defendant
moved to vacate the judgment on the basis of newly discovered
evidence. 4 The court granted a hearing to determine the
"probability" that the new evidence would alter the result of
defendant's conviction if a new trial was granted, and also to
discuss the Brady claim implicit in defendant's alleged new
evidence. 5 The court ultimately held, via first impression, that
the New York State Constitution prohibits the incarceration of a
person who is actually innocent, and permitted the hearing of
evidence with respect to defendant's free-standing claim of
"actual innocence" inherent in his motion.6
A fatal shooting occurred on a Brooklyn Street in August
1985. 7 The evidence accumulated at the time of the investigation
consisted of oral statements by various witnesses identifying the
defendant as the shooter, a statement by another witness, Mr.
Fleming, who identified by photograph an individual who was
incarcerated at the time of the fatal incident, and additional
witnesses who identified persons that the investigation later ruled
'N.Y.L.J., Sept. 20, 2002, at 20, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
2 J.D. Candidate 2004, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
This paper received an Honorable Mention for second place in the Annual
Lawrence Robert Gould New York State Constitutional Law writing
competition.
3 Cole, supra note 1.4 Cole, supra note 1.
4 Cole, supra note 1.
6 Cole, supra note I (stating, "[t]his presents a novel issue of whether the
New York State Constitution recognizes a free-standing claim of innocence as
grounds to vacate a judgment of conviction.")
7 Cole, supra note 1.
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out. 8 Approximately six months later, Jeffrey Campbell, while
incarcerated on an unrelated matter, identified the defendant as
the shooter, and another eyewitness identified the defendant by
photograph and a subsequent lineup. 9 Sometime thereafter, Mr.
Fleming and the defendant testified at a grand jury presentation. '0
In February 1986, the defendant was charged with murder in the
second degree and related charges."1 The defendant was
arraigned in March 1986, and pled not guilty.'
2
In the same month the defendant was arraigned, Jeffrey
Campbell and another eyewitness testified for the prosecution and
both identified the defendant as the shooter.' 3  One of the
defendant's witnesses testified that he knew the defendant, and
the defendant was not the shooter.14  Furthermore, an alibi
witness placed the defendant elsewhere at the time of the
shooting.15 However, Mr. Fleming and the defendant did not
testify at the trial.'
6
In March 1987, the defendant was convicted of
manslaughter in the first degree and was sentenced to twelve and
one-half years to twenty-five years, and other lesser terms to run
concurrently. 17 Approximately seven years later, the defendant
filed a vacatur motion because Mr. Campbell recanted his
testimony.' 8 The motion was denied because Mr. Campbell's
audio-taped recantation was never submitted to the court by
sworn transcript, and as a result, the court held the papers were
legally insufficient. Mr. Campbell passed away shortly
thereafter. ' 9
a Cole, supra note 1.
9 Cole, supra note 1.
10 Cole, supra note 1.
" Cole, supra note 1.
12 Cole, supra note 1.
13 Cole, supra note 1.
14 Cole, supra note 1.
'5 Cole, supra note 1.
16 Cole, supra note 1.
17 Cole, supra note 1.
" Cole, supra note 1.
'9 Cole, supra note 1.
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The defendant then submitted various documents alleging
newly discovered evidence. 20  The evidence consisted of a
transcript of Mr. Campbell's recantation, affidavits of Mr.
Fleming, and three eyewitnesses claiming the defendant was not
the shooter. The new evidence also included the affidavits of
alibi witnesses, who were never called upon at trial, the affidavits
of two eyewitnesses who testified at trial, and an affidavit of
defendant's investigator claiming that the prosecution's
eyewitness recanted. 2  The prosecution presented an affidavit
that their eyewitness did not recant.22
The court noted that Mr. Campbell (whose transcript of
recantation defendant attempts to introduce) testified at trial that
he received threats from the defendant's brother and others.
However, the court also noted that the trial minutes indicated that
Mr. Fleming, who testified for the prosecution at the grand jury
presentation, was paid for his testimony. a3
The court discussed that its power to grant a new trial on
the ground of newly discovered evidence rests on the unlimited
discretion of the court to determine that all the requirements for
newly discovered evidence claims are met, in accordance with the
24statute. In order to satisfy the statute, the proffered evidence
20 Cole, supra note 1.
21 Cole, supra note 1.
22 Cole, supra note 1.
23 Cole, supra note 1.
24 Cole, supra note 1 (citing People v. Salemi, 309 N.Y. 208, 215, 128
N.E.2d 377, 381, (1955); People v. Pugh, 236 A.D.2d 810, 811, 653
N.Y.S.2d 994, 996 (4th Dep't 1997); People v. Latella, 112 A.D.2d 321, 322,
491 N.Y.S.2d 771, 772 (2d Dep't 1985); People v. Balan, 107 A.D.2d 811,
813, 484 A.D.2d 648, 649 (2d Dep't 1985); People v. Baxley, 84 N.Y.2d
208, 212, 639 N.E.2d 746, 749, 616 N.Y.S.2d 7, 10 (1994); People v.
Crimmins, 38 N.Y.2d 407, 415, 343 N.E.2d 719, 725, 381 N.Y.S.2d 1, 20
(1975); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440. 10(1)(g) (McKinney 2002)).
Section 440. 10(1)(g) provides in pertinent part:
At any time after the entry of a judgment, the court in which
it was entered may, upon motion of the defendant, vacate
such judgment upon the ground that:
(g) New evidence has been discovered since the entry of a
judgment based upon a verdict of guilty after trial, which
could not have been produced by the defendant at the trial
2003 477
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must meet all six criteria: 25 it must be of such nature that it would
probably change the result if a new trial were held; it must have
been discovered after trial; it must have been undiscoverable
prior to or during trial, notwithstanding defendant's exercise of
due diligence; it must be material to the issue; it must not be
merely cumulative; and, it must not merely impeach or contradict
evidence given at trial.26
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the transcript of Mr.
Campbell's recantation, the affidavit of Mr. Fleming claiming the
defendant was not the shooter, and the affidavits of the
defendant's two eyewitnesses who testified at trial, are not newly
discovered evidence. 27 However, the court allowed this evidence
to be considered in the determination of whether the proffered
evidence would have "probably" altered the result, in
conjunction with the testimony of the three eyewitnesses who also
claimed defendant was not the shooter. 28 Although the affidavits
are inconsistent and created serious issues of credibility, the court
ordered a hearing to determine whether through due diligence,
the witnesses could have been discovered earlier, if they were
even with due diligence on his part and which is of such
character as to create a probability that had such evidence
been received at the trial the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defendant; provided that a motion based on
such ground must be made with due diligence after the
discovery of such alleged new evidence ....
25 Cole, supra note 1. Note, however, that as discussed, infra, the court did
not require all six criteria to be met herein due to the unconstitutionality of an
actual innocence claim, and will allow all of the defendant's newly discovered
evidence to be submitted at the hearing.
26 Cole, supra note 1 (citing Salemi, 309 N.Y. at 216, 128 N.E.2d at 383)
(defining "it" as the newly discovered evidence which must be evidence
admissible at trial); see also People v. Boyette, 201 A.D.2d 490, 491, 607
N.Y.S.2d 402, 404 (2nd Dep't 1994); People v. Dabbs, 154 Misc. 2d 671,
674, 587 N.Y.S.2d 90, 92 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1991); People v.
Fields, 66 N.Y.2d 876, 877, 489 N.E.2d 728, 729, 498 N.Y.S.2d 759, 760
(1985).
27 Cole, supra note 1.
28 Cole, supra note 1.
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credible, and whether the proposed newly discovered evidence, in
its entirety, would "probably" have altered the result.29
Additionally, the court pointed out that even though
defendant did not make a Brady3 ° claim, several of the new
witnesses allegedly provided the police with statements that the
defendant did not commit the crime, and nothing in the record
demonstrated defendant received such statements from the
prosecution. 3' Accordingly, even though the defendant did not
make a Brady claim, the court found the affidavits "raise[d] the
issue,, 32 and therefore ordered the hearing to include the Brady
claim.33 In accordance with Brady, the burden is upon the State
to disclose exculpatory evidence if, in the absence of the
undisclosed evidence, it is reasonably possible to affect the guilt
or innocence of the defendant.34 If the defendant can show that
he did not know and could not have known that the exculpatory
evidence existed, and that it was never disclosed, such failure by
the prosecution constitutes a due process violation. 35 As such,
the Cole court declared that it would hear evidence on the issue of
a Brady claim at the hearing.
Next, the Cole court recognized that without explicitly
arguing the point, the defendant made *a freestanding claim of
actual innocence in his motion to vacate his judgment.36 As the
court pointed out, even in the absence of a claim of an underlying
constitutional violation at the trial stage, "[t]his presents a novel
29 Cole, supra note 1.
30 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963) (holding that "the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.").
31 Cole, supra note 1.
32 Cole, supra note 1.
33 Cole, supra note 1.
34 Cole, supra note 1 (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 88; People v. Vilardi, 76
N.Y.2d 67, 73, 555 N.E.2d 915, 917, 556 N.Y.S.2d 518, 520 (1990).
35 Cole, supra note 1 (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 88; Vilardi, 76 N.Y.2d at
73, 555 N.E.2d at 917, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 520; United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 112 (1976)).36Cole, supra note 1.
2003 479
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issue of whether the New York State Constitution3' recognizes a
free-standing claim of innocence as grounds to vacate a judgment
of conviction. "
38
The court began its analysis of this issue by first
discussing the federal precedent with respect to the
constitutionality of claims of actual innocence under the United
States Constitution. 39 The United States Supreme Court has been
reluctant to hold that the Federal Constitution provides a remedy
for state prisoners raising a free-standing claim of actual
innocence on federal habeas corpus review, 40 and further,
following Herrera4' and Schulp,42 as long as the state provides
for the pardon of an actually innocent defendant, the United
States Constitution does not prohibit leaving an actually innocent
person in jail.43 Conversely, the Cole court held that even though
New York State provides for the pardon of an actually innocent
defendant, the New York State Constitution prohibits the
incarceration of a person who is actually innocent. 4
37 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: ". . . No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
38 Cole, supra note 1.
39 U.S. CONST. amend. V states, inter alia: "No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime ... nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ."; U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII provides in pertinent part: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."; U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV declares: "No... State [shall] deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
40 Cole, supra note I (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399-400
(1993)).
41 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
42 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
43 Cole, supra note I (citing Royal v. Taylor, 188 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir.
(1999); Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1338-89 (10th Cir. 1998); Lucas v.
Johnson, 132 F.3d 1069, 1075-77 (5th Cir. 1998); Meadows v. Delo, 99 F.3d
280, 288 (8th Cir. 1996); Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 705-06 (7th Cir.
1994)).
4 Cole, supra note 1. The court analyzes how other jurisdictions deal with
the issue of actual innocence and notes that most states hold that a claim of
actual innocence, in and of itself, is not sufficient to vacate a conviction while
480 [Vol 19
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In Herrera v. Collins,45 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of an inmate's
habeas corpus petition arguing that he was actually innocent of
the crime of murder. 46  Upon grant of certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed the denial, holding that the
defendant's claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence was not a ground for federal habeas corpus relief absent
an independent constitutional violation.47 The defendant was
afforded a fair trial and was found guilty of capital murder
48beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court reasoned that the State's
refusal to hear the defendant's newly discovered evidence eight
years after his conviction "did not transgress any principle of
fundamental fairness." 
49
Leonel Torres Herrera was convicted of the capital
murder of a police officer in September 1991 and sentenced to
death in January 1982.50 In July of that same year, Herrera
pleaded guilty to, but did not receive the death sentence for, the
murder of another officer who was shot and killed that same
evening. 51 The defendant unsuccessfully appealed his conviction
and was subsequently denied his first petition for habeas corpus
relief.52 Herrera then filed a second habeas corpus petition, ten
years after his conviction, claiming that he was actually
innocent.53  He presented newly discovered evidence that
consisted of affidavits of his nephew and of a mutual schoolmate
of the Herrera brothers, alleging that it was Herrera's now
deceased brother who shot the two officers. Herrera also made a
only a minority of states hold the incarceration of an actually innocent
defendant unconstitutional; see nn. 97, 98 infra.
4 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
46 Id. at 393.
41 Id. at'393, 400.
48 Id. at 399-400.
49 1d. at 411.
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Brady claim, alleging the police were aware of this evidence and
withheld it.
54
The defendant claimed that because he was innocent, his
execution would violate the Eighth
55  and Fourteenth56
Amendments to the United States Constitution. 57 Although the
Supreme Court of the United States never explicitly ruled on this
issue, the Court indicated that Herrera's claim failed to fall within
the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,"8 and that the
refusal of Texas to consider newly discovered evidence eight
years later, did not violate procedural due process.5 9
The majority in Herrera reiterated that a claim of actual
innocence is not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a
gateway that a defendant must pass through to have the merits of
an otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on collateral
review. 60  This has been dubbed what is known as the
"fundamental miscarriage of justice exception," which is
grounded in the equitable discretion of habeas courts. 61  The
Court reasoned, however, that Herrera was not entitled to habeas
relief because he was not claiming a procedural error, but that
new evidence demonstrated that he should not have been
convicted.62 This does not entitle him to the exception because it
is available, "only where the prisoner supplements his
constitutional claim with a colorable showing of actual
14 Id. at 397.
55 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted."
56 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "No... State [shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
57 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 411.60 Id. at 404.
61 Id. (citing Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992); McCleskey v. Zant,
499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991)).
62 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
482 [Vol 19
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innocence." 63 Stating further, "[w]e have never held that [the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception] extends to a
freestanding claim of actual innocence. "64
But the Court also assumed, "for the sake of argument a
truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence' proffered
after trial would render the execution of a defendant
unconstitutional . . . if there were no state avenue open to process
such a claim." 65 Accordingly, the majority concluded that since
Herrera could file for clemency under Texas' Clemency Law, the
Court disposed of Herrera's free-standing claim of actual
innocence, finding that it fell far short of the "extraordinarily
high" threshold showing that would be required for such an
assumed right.66
Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion denounced the
majority's position and stated that a condemned prisoner had a
constitutional right to proffer new evidence which would prove
his innocence,67 and the concurring opinions agreed with that
aspect of the dissent's argument. 68 However, Justice Scalia stated
there is no basis for a constitutional right which allows for
judicial consideration of evidence of actual innocence after a
conviction. 69 Three years after Herrera's unfortunate decision, it
remained, "[u]nder the federal system, [that] a claim of
innocence by a State prisoner is not, in and of itself, sufficient
ground for granting of habeas corpus relief, but permits the
federal courts to overlook procedural grounds barring other
Federal Constitutional claims." 
70
63 Id. (citing Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986)).
4Id. at 404-05.6 1 Id. at 417.
66d. at 417-19.
67 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68 Id. at 875. Justice O'Connor declared, "I cannot disagree with the
fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the
Constitution." Id. at 870 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Justice White similarly
assumed that the demonstration of " 'actual innocence' made after the trial
would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in this case." Id.
(White, J., concurring).
69 Id. at 874-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
'0 Cole, supra note 1 (citing Schulp v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)).
2003 483
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In another United States Supreme Court case, Schulp v.
Delo,71 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the denial of petitioner inmate's second request for
federal habeas corpus relief.72 Upon certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court and
held that the court below applied the wrong standard in evaluating
the defendant's claim of actual innocence. 73 The Court reasoned
that the district court should have focused on the likely behavior
of the trier of fact, and should have assessed the probative force
of the defendant's new evidence in connection with the evidence
of guilt adduced at trial.74 The case was remanded to the circuit
court with instructions to remand to the district court for further
proceedings. 5
Lloyd Schulp was a prisoner convicted of stabbing a
fellow inmate to death.76 At Schulp's trial in December 1985, the
prosecution's evidence consisted solely of the eyewitness
testimony of two corrections officers, without any physical
evidence connecting Schulp to the killing.77 Schulp pleaded not
guilty and his defense introduced a videotape from a camera in
the prison's dining room that showed he could not have been at
the scene of the crime at the time that the murder took place, and
that seconds after the stabbing, another inmate ran into the dining
room dripping with blood. 78 Nevertheless, the jury returned a
verdict of guilty and sentenced him to death.79
After Schulp unsuccessfully appealed, exhausted his state
collateral remedies, and was denied a federal writ of habeas
corpus on his first petition, he then filed a second federal habeas
petition challenging his conviction and sentence.80 Similar to
7 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
72 Id. at 301.
7 Id. at 324.
74 Id. at 331-32.
Id. at 332.
76 Schulp, 513 U.S. at 301-02.
77 Id. at 302.
7 Id. at 303.
79 Id. at 305.
80 Id. at 306.
484 [Vol 19
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Herrera, Schulp sought to introduce numerous affidavits attesting
to his actual innocence of the murder, and also argued that his
execution would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.8 ' In addition, however, Schulp
also raised the issue of ineffective counsel for failing to interview
alibi witnesses, and to discover the State's failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence. s2
The Supreme Court distinguished Schulp's claim of
innocence from Herrera's, stating that whereas Herrera had
claimed that his assertion of innocence, in and of itself,
constituted a substantive ground for habeas relief, Schulp's
constitutional claims were not based on his innocence, but rather
on procedural claims of ineffectiveness of counsel and
withholding of evidence by the prosecution. 3  His claim of
innocence, therefore, was only used as a vehicle to get through
the "gateway" which would allow review of his other
constitutional claims.*4
In Schulp, the Supreme Court considered the question of
what burden of proof should be imposed upon a petitioner
alleging a miscarriage of justice exception, including a claim of
actual innocence.8 5 The Supreme Court analyzed the miscarriage
of justice exception as applied to a petitioner who claimed he was
"actually innocent of the death penalty" and abandoned the
holding that such a habeas petitioner "must show by clear and
convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no
reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the
death penalty." 86 Rather, the Court held that when the claimed
s' Schulp, 513 U.S. at 307.
82 Id. at 307.
I d. at 314.
84 Id. at 314-15 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 (1993)).
85 Id. at 322. (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986)
"[pletitioner must show that the constitutional error 'probably' resulted in the
conviction of one who was actually innocent; Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S.
436, 454 n. 17 (1986) ("establishing by a 'fair probability,' [that] 'the trier of
facts would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt.' ")
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injustice is that constitutional error has resulted in the conviction
of one who is actually innocent, the proper standard is that
petitioner must show that it was more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.87 In order to make such a showing, the burden
is placed on the petitioner to support his alleged constitutional
violations with reliable new evidence that was not presented at
trial, including evidence that may be exculpatory scientific,
critical physical evidence, or new eyewitness affidavits. 88  The
court of appeals and the district court utilized an improper
standard, and accordingly, Schulp was granted further
proceedings on remand.89
It remains, however, that where the court cannot find that
it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted a defendant in light of the new evidence presented, and
where the State provides a clemency process, there is no relief
for a claim of actual innocence under the United States
Constitution. 90
It would be appropriate to note however, that since
Herrera and Schulp were decided, Congress adopted the Federal
Death Penalty Act of 1994, 91 which states that a defendant who
has been found guilty of the proscribed crime shall be sentenced
to death if, after consideration of the factors set forth in the
statute, it is determined that imposition of a death sentence is
87 Id. at 324 (justifying "the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception
seeks to balance the societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of
scarce judicial resources with the individual interest in justice that arises in the
extraordinary case," and concluding, "that [the] Carrier [standard], rather than
[the] Sawyer [standard], properly strikes that balance when the claimed
injustice is that constitutional error has resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent of the crime.").
88 Id. at 324.
9 id. at 332.
9°Cole, supra note 1 (citing Royal, 188 F.3d at 243; Sellers, 135 F.3d at
1338-[3]9; Lucas, 132 F.3d at 1075-77; Meadows, 99 F.3d at 288; Milone, 22
F.3d at 705-06).
9' Pub. L. No. 103-322, Title VI, §§ 60001-60026, 108 Stat. 1959 (Sept. 13,
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justified.92 In July 2002, the Federal Death Penalty Act was held
unconstitutional by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in United States v. Quinones,
93
and subsequently reversed on appeal by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 94 In the former opinion, the
United States District Court reasoned that:
[T]he best available evidence indicates that, on the
one hand, innocent people are sentenced to death
with materially greater frequency than was
previously supposed and that, on the other hand,
convincing proof of their innocence often does not
emerge until long after their convictions. It is
therefore fully foreseeable that in enforcing the
death penalty a meaningful number of innocent
people will be executed who otherwise would
eventually be able to prove their innocence. It
follows that implementation of the Federal Death
Penalty Act not only deprives innocent people of a
significant opportunity to prove their innocence,
and thereby violates procedural due process, but
also creates an undue risk of executing innocent
people, and thereby violates substantive due
process. 95
The court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision
refusing to overturn the holding of Herrera.96 The court rejected
the district court's reasoning that "evolving standards" mandate
consideration of a defendant's liberty interest under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 97 and maintains, via
92 18 U.S.C. § 3591.
93 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y.).
94 United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002).
9' Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
96 Quinones, 313 F.3d at 52 (reiterating, "there is no fundamental right to a
continued opportunity for exoneration throughout the course of one's natural
life.").
97 U.S. Const. amend. V.
2003 487
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precedent98  and legislative intent, 99  that the "continued
opportunity to exonerate oneself throughout the natural course of
one's life is not a right 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' " 00
Given that the court of appeals expressly denied holding
that the death penalty is unconstitutional regardless of new,
"evolving" evidence, it remains that a claim of actual innocence
is still not grounds for relief for an incarcerated individual not
sentenced to death under the United States Constitution. As
stated in People v. Cole, because New York State provides for
the pardon of an actually innocent defendant,' 0 ' the incarceration
98 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203," 238 (1997); Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (reiterating the
obligation of the Court of Appeals to follow controlling case law); Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207 (1976) (holding that capital punishment does not
constitute a per se violation of the Eighth Amendment).
99 Quinones, 313 F.3d at 64-65 (noting the deliberative legislative action by
Congress in enacting the FDPA).
'oo Id. at 62 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). See also
U.S. v. Matthews, No. 00-CR-269, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25664 (N.D.N.Y.
Dec. 31, 2002) (denying defendant's motion to declare the "Death Penalty
Statutes" unconstitutional); U.S. v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 491 (D. Vt.
2002) (refusing to address the constitutionality of the Federal Death Penalty
Act even though the issue of deprivation of due process raised by the
defendant, "may have legal merit.").
10' Cole, supra note 1 (citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 19 (McKinney 2002),
which states:
Upon motion duly made therefore, the judgment of
conviction must be set aside and the indictment, information
or complaint dismissed by the court in which the defendant
was convicted, in a case where the defendant shall receive a
pardon from the governor stating that such pardon is issued
on the ground of innocence of the crime for which he was
convicted and further stating that such finding of innocence is
based upon evidence discovered after the judgment of
conviction was rendered and after the time within which to
make a motion for a new trial on newly discovered evidence
had expired. Such setting aside of a judgment of conviction
and dismissal of an indictment, information or complaint
against a defendant shall place the defendant in the same
position as if the indictment, information or complaint had
been dismissed at the conclusion of the trial by the court
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of an actual innocent person in New York would not violate the
Federal Constitution.
10 2
Similarly, many states have followed the Herrera-Schulp
dichotomy that a free-standing claim of actual innocence, in and
of itself, is not sufficient to provide for relief after conviction;
however, a showing of actual innocence will overcome
procedural bars to claims other than actual innocence.'
0 3
Conversely, a few states have held that the incarceration of an
actually innocent person is either unconstitutional or is, in and of
itself, sufficient newly discovered evidence permitting the court
to vacate a judgment of conviction. 104
The Cole court, however, did not find any New York case
answering the question of whether New York State's Constitution
prohibits the incarceration of an actually innocent person.1
0 5
Alternatively, the Cole court agreed with the reasoning and
holding stated by the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v.
Washington,10 6 and subsequently held that the New York State
Constitution also prohibits the incarceration of a person who is
actually innocent.' 0 7
because of the failure to establish the defendant's guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt); see also People v. Chichester,
162 Misc. 2d 658, 659 (County Ct., Suffolk County 1994)).
102 Cole, supra note 1.
103 Cole, supra note 1 (citing State v. Byrd, 710 N.E.2d 1043, 1053-54
(Ohio Ct. App. 2001); State v. Ratliff, 71 S.W.3d 291, 296-98 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2001); State v. Placzkiewicz, 36 P.3d 934, 936 (Mont. 2001); State v.
Norsworthy, 71 S.W.3d 610 (Mont. 2002); Pellegrini v. State, 34 P.3d 519,
537 (Nev. 2001); Hefferman v. State, 2002 WL 1303388 (Ark.)).
104 Cole, supra note 1 (citing People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill.
1996); Miller v. Commissioner of Correction, 700 A.2d 1108 (Conn. 1997); In
re Clark, 855 P.2d 729 (Cal. 1993); Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1997)).
105 Cole, supra note 1. The court did find a case whereby the civil trial court
.seems to have assumed that it is illegal to incarcerate an actually innocent
person." Id. (holding that defendant's petition to permit DNA testing of
evidence was granted reasoning that, "to deny petitioner the opportunity to
prove his innocence with such [DNA] evidence simply to ensure the finality of
convictions is untenable.").
'06 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996).
107 Cole, supra note 1.
2003 489
15
Kavanagh: People v. Cole
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2003
TOURO LAWREVIEW
In Washington, the defendant was convicted of murder,
and at trial, the State's evidence consisted of two eyewitnesses
who were in a parked car near the scene of the murder.'08 The
two witnesses testified that they had been approached by
Washington and then watched as he approached and shot the
victim after the victim had just left his home.' 09 Washington
presented the testimony of a store employee, an acquaintance, and
his mother, who all testified that he was at a grocery store when
the murder occurred. 110  Nevertheless, the jury convicted
Washington, and he was sentenced to twenty-five years
imprisonment. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed
Washington's conviction." '
Washington collaterally attacked his conviction by filing a
petition under Illinois' Post-Conviction Hearing Act.112 He
alleged, inter alia, ineffective trial counsel for failure to properly
investigate evidence that someone else committed the murder.
1 3
Washington's claim was supported by an affidavit of Jacqueline
Martin. 1 4 The trial judge held an in camera hearing, and the
substance of Martin's testimony constituted newly discovered
evidence, which became the basis for the claim on appeal. " 5
Martin testified that she accompanied her boyfriend and
another individual, who were seeking to avenge an earlier beating
of her boyfriend's brother, on the date of the incident.' 6 Martin
remained in a parked car in an alley whereby shortly after her
boyfriend and the other individual left the car, she heard two
'0s Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1331.
109 Id.
110 Id.
1" See People v. Washington, 472 N.E.2d 1244 (I11. App. Ct. 1984).
12 725 I11. Comp. Stat. 5/122 1. Illinois' PCHA provides that "[a]ny person
imprisoned in the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the
Constitution of the United States or the State of Illinois or both may institute a
proceeding under this Article." Id.
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gunshots."17  When her boyfriend returned to the car, Martin
heard him say, "[i]t was the wrong guy. "" 8  After being
threatened to death if she did not remain silent, Martin fled to
Mississippi, where she remained for eight years." 9
Based on Martin's testimony, the trial court permitted
Washington to amend his petition to include an additional claim
based on newly discovered evidence.' 20  The trial court then
denied Washington's original grounds for relief, but granted a
new trial based on Washington's newly discovered evidence. 121
The trial court stated that if Martin had testified at the first trial
and had the jury believed her, it would have "had some
significant impact" on the jury.122 The appellate court affirmed
the trial court's grant of relief based on the claim of newly
discovered evidence without addressing Washington's original
claims. 123  The Supreme Court of Illinois granted the State's
petition for leave to appeal. '
24
Because this newly discovered evidence did not implicate
any State action, nor was Washington denied "ad judicatory" due
process, the issue the Illinois Supreme Court decided was
whether, under Illinois State Constitution, a convicted person
117 id.
118 Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1331.




123 See People v. Washington, 628 N.E.2d*558, 561-62 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
124 Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1332. Washington filed a cross-appeal
contesting the trial court's denial of his first nine claims. Id. The State moved
to strike the cross-appeal under the fugitive dismissal doctrine, see 725 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/115 4.1, because Washington failed to appear at a bond
revocation hearing for an unrelated offense that took place after his release
from prison. Id. See also People v. Partee, 530 N.E.2d 460, 464-65 (Ill. 1988)
(concluding that an appellate court is not required to hear a fugitive
defendant's appeal in all instances and retains discretionary power to refuse to
hear the appeal unless and until the fugitive returns to the jurisdiction). The
Supreme Court granted the State's motion and dismissed Washington's cross-
appeal. Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1332.
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should be afforded additional process when newly discovered
evidence shows a defendant is actually innocent. 
2 5
Following Justice Blackmun's dissent in Herrera, the
Washington Court held that to ignore a claim of actual innocence
would be "fundamentally unfair" as a matter of procedural due
process. 126 Substantively, the Washington Court, citing the
dissent in Herrera, agreed that, "imprisonment of the innocent
would also be so conscience shocking as to trigger operation of
substantive due process." 1 27 The Washington Court also dictated
that, unlike the apparent conflict that the Herrera majority faced
in assuming, "for the sake of argument," 128 that a truly
persuasive demonstration of actual innocence would make a
conviction unconstitutional, the Court had "no difficulty seeing
why substantive due progess as a matter of Illinois Constitutional
law offers the grounds for such a conclusion." 1
29
In that accord, the Illinois Supreme Court said, and the
Supreme Court of the State of New York agreed:
We believe that no person convicted of a crime
should be deprived of life or liberty given
compelling evidence of actual innocence. See
generally Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417; see also
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 419 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring, joined by Kennedy, J.)
(acknowledging as a 'fundamental legal principle
that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the
Constitution'). Given the limited avenues that our
legislature has so far seen fit to provide for raising
free-standing claims of innocence, that idea-but for
the possibility of executive clemency-would go
ignored in cases like this one. We therefore hold as
125 Washington. 665 N.E.2d at 1336.
126 Id. (citing People v. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d 923 (I11. 994); and Herrera,
506 U.S. at 435, 436-37 n.5, (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens
and Souter, JJ.); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437 (1992)).
127 Id. at 1336 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 436-7 (Blackmun, J., dissenting,
joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ.)).
'28 See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 392.
129 Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1336 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417).
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a matter of Illinois constitutional jurisprudence that
a claim of newly discovered evidence showing a
defendant to be actually innocent of the crime for
which he was convicted is cognizable as a matter
of due process. That holding aligns Illinois with
other jurisdictions likewise recognizing, primarily
as a matter of state habeas corpus jurisprudence, a
basis to raise such claims under the rubric of due
process. 130
Accordingly, the Cole court held that "the New York
State Constitution also prohibits the incarceration of a person who
is actually innocent." 131 As such, the court allowed Cole to
submit any evidence of innocence, including those that otherwise
would not have met the statutory requirements as newly
discovered evidence. 1
32
The question that remains, however, is what degree of
proof is required for a showing of actual innocence. As the court
indicated in Cole, "there is no general agreement among the
courts as to the proper standard of proof. There is also no
agreement among the concurring or dissenting United States
Supreme Court Justices in Herrera."133 The court intends to
answer this question upon the conclusion of a hearing by allowing
both sides the opportunity to argue the degree of proof required.
The hearing commenced on December 9, 2002, at the Supreme
Courthouse in Kings County, New York, and has been
130 Cole, supra note 1 (quoting Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1337). The
dissent in Washington by Justice Miller, joined by Justice Bilandic, invoking
People v Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147 (I11. 984), would apply Herrera because the
Illinois and federal provisions are identical and because there "is nothing in the
debates of the 1970 state constitutional convention that suggests that the
drafters intended the Illinois provision to mean something different from its
federal counterpart." Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1342.
131 Cole, supra note 1.
132 Cole, supra note 1. This allowance is distinguishable from Washington,
whereby the court added after its holding that such new evidence must be new,
material and not cumulative, and of such conclusive character that it would
probably change the result in a new trial. See Washington, 665 N.E.2d at
1337.
133 Cole, supra note 1.
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concluded. However, as of the date of this writing, 134 Justice
Leventhal has not yet rendered his decision setting forth the
results of the hearing.
In conclusion, the United States Constitution does not
prohibit incarcerating an innocent person in a non-capital case so
long as the state provides for a pardon based upon innocence. 135
Following Herrera, a claim of actual innocence based on newly
discovered evidence, in and of itself, is not violative of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. Although it has been assumed,
arguendo, that the execution of an individual who had made a
persuasive claim of actual innocence would violate the
Constitution and therefore warrant federal habeas relief if no state
pardon proceedings were available, the United States Supreme
Court has refused to hold that such a claim exists in every
case. 136  Further, as a result of Schulp, where an individual
asserts an actual innocence claim as a procedural gateway to
assert an otherwise defaulted claim, the petitioner must show that
it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, in light of the
newly discovered evidence.137 After People v. Cole, however,
New York State law, agreeing with Illinois jurisprudence in
People v. Washington, now declares that the New York State
Constitution prohibits the incarceration of a person who is
actually innocent. Yet to be decided is the degree of proof
required for a showing of actual innocence.138 As it currently
stands, as a matter of New York State law, a defendant
presenting a claim of actual innocence is free to submit any
evidence of innocence, including such newly discovered evidence
that would be otherwise barred by the statutory requirements.139
14 Today's date being March 20, 2003.
135 Cole, supra note 1.
136 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
137 Cole, supra note 1.
138 As of March 20, 2003, Justice Leventhal has not yet rendered his decision
on this issue.
3 Cole, supra note 1.
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